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On February 21, 2006, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Cunningham v. California, which
involves a challenge to the constitutionality of California’s
determinate sentencing system.1 Cunningham offers the
possibility of another important decision in the line of
cases, beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 that have
expanded the right to a jury trial in the sentencing context.
The case obviously warrants close attention from California practitioners, as well as those who work in other states
with similar sentencing systems.3 This Article will discuss
reasons why federal practitioners and policy makers
should also pay attention to Cunningham.
I. Background: California’s Determinate
Sentencing System

For many crimes, California law specifies that one of three
sentences may be imposed: an upper term, a middle term, or
a lower term.4 For instance, the offense of “continuous sexual abuse of a child” is punishable by a term of six, twelve, or
sixteen years’ imprisonment. The sentencing judge must
impose the middle term unless she finds that the aggravating circumstances in the case outweigh the mitigating, or the
mitigating outweigh the aggravating. Rules of court provide a
nonexhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances but otherwise offer little guidance. Judges are thus
left with much freedom in determining what are aggravating
circumstances, what are mitigating circumstances, and how
much weight to give them. However, the basic elements of
the offense itself may not be treated as aggravating.
The California Supreme Court has characterized the
system as highly discretionary, indicating that the decision
to sentence above or below the presumptive middle term
is only constrained by a loose “reasonableness” requirement. While the California system bears many similarities
to the Washington system the U.S. Supreme Court found
to violate jury-trial rights in Blakely v. Washington,5 the California Supreme Court has distinguished the Washington
system as less discretionary. Where Washington judges
were bound by that state’s presumptive sentences unless
they found “substantial and compelling reasons” for a different sentence, California judges may potentially reject
the presumptive middle term on the basis of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.6 On that basis, the

California Supreme Court held in People v. Black that the
California system does indeed comply with the requirements of Blakely.7
II. The Cunningham Litigation

Cunningham was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of
a child and sentenced to the upper term (sixteen years). In
reaching its decision, the sentencing court relied on six
aggravating factors, none of which were found by a jury.
Citing Blakely, Cunningham has argued on appeal—thus
far unsuccessfully—that the California sentencing procedures violated his right to a jury trial.
In his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cunningham
asserted that the California system cannot be distinguished from the Washington system that was overturned
in Blakely, inasmuch as both systems require judicial factfinding in order to increase sentences above a specified
presumptive term.8 In its Brief in Opposition, the State
argued that the California system is more discretionary
than the Washington system because of the open-ended
nature of the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.9 It also claimed that the California system is
indistinguishable from the post-Booker federal system.
III. Points of Interest for Federal Practitioners and
Policy Makers
A. The Intriguing Analogy to Federal Sentencing

While the Supreme Court could decide Cunningham without commenting in any way on the federal system, the
State’s attempt to analogize the California system to the
federal system invites Supreme Court commentary on the
federal system. The Booker remedy opinion, of course,
offered only a bare-bones description of the new federal
advisory guidelines system,10 so we don’t really know much
about the Court’s views on such vital questions as whether
within-range sentences should be treated in any sense as
presumptively correct, what “reasonableness” review by the
appellate courts really means, and whether district court
judges are authorized to impose an outside-the-range sentence on the basis of a disagreement with a policy choice
embodied in the Guidelines. If any of the Justices are interested in weighing in on such questions, Cunningham offers
a convenient opportunity to do so.
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In particular, it will be interesting to see if the Court
responds to the State’s assertion that “under the reformed
[i.e., post-Booker] Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court is not free to impose an aggravated term
irrespective of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances.”11 And what of the flip side of this proposition—a
federal district court is not free to impose a mitigated term
irrespective of the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances? Among other things, a discussion of this point might
provide some insight into the Court’s thinking on the crucial
question of whether judges may impose a non-Guidelines
sentence on the basis of a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines (e.g., as to the notorious 100:1 crack/powder ratio),
without regard to the presence of some unusual factual circumstance in the case.12
B. Counting Votes for Future Cases

There is real uncertainty now as to the Court’s center of
gravity on Apprendi issues. Not only have two new Justices
joined the Court since Booker was decided, but Justice
Ginsburg’s views have also become a matter of considerable speculation. Ginsburg was the only Justice to join
both the merits and remedy majority opinions in Booker,
but she herself did not write an opinion in the case to
explain her position. By joining the merits dissenters in
their remedy opinion, was she indicating that she is having second thoughts about the Apprendi revolution?
Justice Breyer’s current views are also a matter of uncertainty. His concurrence in Harris v. United States was
crucial to preserving mandatory minimums from
Apprendi, yet he expressed misgivings about the logical
inconsistencies between Harris and Apprendi.13 If he
becomes willing to accept Apprendi on stare decisis
grounds, then mandatory minimums are in serious jeopardy. Thus, any writing in Cunningham by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Roberts, or Alito might provide helpful
insights into the future of mandatory minimums and a
host of other Apprendi-related questions.

I am also intrigued by the suggestion in Black (a case
that is sure to be considered by the high court in Cunningham) that the history and intent of a sentencing system
may have some bearing on its constitutionality: The real
concern of Apprendi and its progeny, the California
Supreme Court seemed to be saying, was with the legislature increasing punishment inappropriately by converting
elements of crimes into sentencing factors.14 Thus, the
court found it significant that “California’s adoption of the
determinate sentencing law reduced the length of potential
sentences for most crimes, rather than increasing them.”15
I, for one, think this is a misreading of the Apprendi line of
cases, but, with two new members on the Court and the
potential for malleability in Justice Ginsburg’s views, perhaps the time is ripe for some revisionist history. And if the
approach of the California Supreme Court were to be
adopted, this might lead to the surprising conclusion that
new mandatory guidelines could be imposed at the federal
level if they were structured so as to reduce defendants’ sentencing exposure.
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C. Future Legislative Reform

Cunningham may effectively impose new constraints on
legislative responses to Booker or, alternatively, suggest
new ways for Congress to reinstitute mandatory guidelines in a constitutional fashion. Most obviously, the
central question posed by Cunningham is how discretionary a “discretionary” system needs to be in order to
avoid Apprendi problems. In its discussion of this question, the Court may further delineate some of the
constitutional parameters within which legislative reformers will have to operate.
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This Article was originally presented as a talk at the annual
meeting of the Eastern District of Wisconsin Bar Association
in April 2006. I am grateful for the comments and questions
of those in attendance.
People v. Cunningham, 2005 WL 880983 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert.
granted, 126 S.Ct. 1329 (2006).
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
For recent decisions from other states considering similar
constitutional challenges to similar sentencing systems, see
State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15 (Ariz. 2004); Lopez v. People, 113
P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.
2005); State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724 (N.J. 2005).
The relevant California statutes are described and interpreted
at length in People v. Black, 113 P.3d 534, 537-39, 543-46
(Cal. 2005), from which the material in this section is drawn.
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Black, 113 P.3d at 545-46.
Id. at 548.
Cunningham v. California, Brief in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, 2005 WL 3785203.
Cunningham v. California, Brief in Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, 2005 WL 3783460.
See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 767 (2005).
Cunningham, Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2005 WL 3783460, at *6.
See, e.g., United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2006)
(“[S]entencing decisions must be done case by case and
must be grounded in case-specific considerations, not in general disagreement with broad-based policies enunciated by
Congress or the Commission, as its agent.”).
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569-70 (2002) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
See Black, 113 P.3d at 544-45.
Id. at 544.
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